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Five Chinese Historical Events That Don’t Get Much Attention
February 11, 2008 in The Five-List Plan by The China Beat | 5 comments

By Kate Merkel-Hess
After Jeremiah Jenne recently posed a question about “the most important Chinese historical figure
most people have never heard of,” I got to thinking about the vast expanse of Chinese history that is
so often neglected in favor of the (admittedly sometimes more-relevant) post-49 events. In
chronological order, here are my five nominations for Chinese historical events I wish were more often
talked and written about. What events make your list?
1. The An Lushan Rebellion
Led by the rogue general, An Lushan, the civil war that riled the Tang Dynasty from 755 to 763
caused death by violence and famine of over ten million people. But the An Lushan Rebellion is not on
this list because of its high death toll. The rebellion also destabilized the Tang political regime and the
aristocratic clans who supported it, reshaping a system that relied heavily on pedigree for
advancement. Histories of China’s imperial exam system often note that it existed (in some form,
though off-and-on) beginning in the Han. But until the An Lushan Rebellion, hereditary position
mattered more than merit. In the post-rebellion upheaval, however, the state centralized the process

of appointing officials, a process that would become incr
easingly
regulated and transparent in the following centuries (and particularly with the reforms of Zhu Xi in the
12th century). Until the end of the Qing (and beyond, but that’s another story), most officeholders
were, indeed, from the wealthy families that could afford to support their sons as they studied
decades for the exams (exam passers were often in their 40s or even older), but there was the
possibility—and some famous examples of—poor men who rose to high position. China’s meritocratic
officialdom—the world’s first meritocracy—had enormous ramifications for the bureaucracy itself, but
its greatest impact was to create a national elite culture whereby well-educated men from around
China, despite linguistic tradition or family background, participated in a shared intellectual tradition.
Notably, this intellectual life took deepest root in the wealthy southern Yangzi Delta, an area whose
population and economy grew rapidly after the An Lushan Rebellion as a direct result of the southward
migrations that resulted from the rebellion’s upheaval. The nouveau riche landlords who emerged in
this area found the revised exam system a particularly effective way to convert their wealth into
officially-recognized status.
2. The Founding of the Yuan Dynasty
Most people even a little familiar with Chinese or world history have heard of Kublai Khan (grandson of
Genghis), the founder of the Yuan Dynasty, which ruled China from 1271 to 1368. The Mongol
conquering and governing of China, however, had more implications than just the spread of the
plague and the introduction of new warfare techniques. Sinologists have traditionally seen the Yuan as

an exception in Chinese history—foreign, nomad
ic rulers who practiced Tibetan
Buddhism (as well as their own animist traditions) who were not, unlike the Manchus, successfully
“sinicized.” Recent revisitations of this history, however, have provided new ideas about the legacy of
the Mongols. On the one hand, there are the accidental implications—the incursions of northern
nomadic peoples, even before Genghis’s military sweep, sent many northern Chinese south during the
preceding few centuries (as did Mongol clearing of lands in northern China to make room for more
pastureland). These settlers not only turned southern wilderness to arable land, but established the
cultural and economic heartland of China. Politically, the Mongols centralized power, strengthening the
control of the emperor over the bureaucracy and over local elites. Perhaps most importantly, the
Mongols in many ways set a model for the Qing dynasty—not only as nomads governing an
agricultural empire (as Mark Elliott argued in The Manchu Way, the ruling Manchus—rightly or
wrongly—used the weakening of Mongol nomad customs as the explanation of their downfall, and
used that fact as a rallying cry to maintain their own culture against the incursions of the attractive,
but supposedly soft Chinese culture), but also as a unified multicultural empire that encompassed
under a single state structure a variety of religious and ethnic groups. These geographic boundaries
and ethnic diversity were ideas that early twentieth century reformers worked hard to maintain, and
homages to them can be readily seen in today’s Chinese culture and politics.
3. The Single Whip Reforms
Arguably of greater importance to world history than Chinese history, the Ming Dynasty Single Whip
Reform of 1581 ordered that all land taxes in China be paid in silver. One in a series of reforms
(referred to in their entirety as the “Single Whip Reforms”; 1581 is perhaps the most important of
them) that increasingly monetized the Chinese tax system, the changes impacted even the lowliest
Chinese peasant—who could no longer pay his taxes in kind, but instead had to purchase silver in
order to do so. The reform could not have been implemented without the large amount of silver
pouring into China from Spanish Empire (South American) mines, and the resulting domestic need for
silver pushed up its global price. It has even been argued by Dennis Flynn that without Chinese
demand pushing up silver prices, the Spanish crown would not have earned enough from its New
World possessions to keep governing them, much less finance decades of warfare in Europe itself. And
it’s also worth remembering that under the Song and Yuan Dynasties, China actually had a functioning
paper currency system—the world’s first. Had the Ming restored that rather than following the private
sector’s turn to silver (after the late Yuan and especially the early Ming destroyed confidence in paper
currency by over-printing it) both Chinese and global history might have been quite different.
4. The White Lotus Rebellion
Arguments about China’s nineteenth-century “dynastic decline” often begin with the White Lotus
Rebellion, a sectarian uprising from 1796 to 1804, arguing that the rebellion exposed the inherent
weaknesses of the ruling Manchus and the Qing dynasty. While it is true that there were a range of
symptoms that, retrospectively, indicate the coming problems for the Qing (the increasing neglect of
the waterways over the course of the nineteenth century, for instance), the Qing response to the
White Lotus Rebellion was not one of them. Recent research (for instance, the doctoral research of my
colleague, Wensheng Wang) argues that the Qing government dealt effectively and flexibly with the
White Lotus Rebellion, countering the notion of a static, out-of-touch court too steeped in tradition and
luxury to respond to contemporary events. In this reading, the White Lotus Rebellion becomes instead
an example of the continued vibrancy of Qing rule into the nineteenth century, and raises further
questions for Chinese historians about what events were most important to the “downfall” of the Qing.

5. The 1911 Chinese Revolution
Overshadowed in twentieth century history by the 1949 Communist Revolution, the 1911 Chinese
Revolution proceeded from a remarkable series of localized events. It was not the result of an
inevitable march towards “Westernization” as it is sometimes portrayed in shorthand, but rather
reflective of two strong late nineteenth century trends: increasing nationalism and increasing localism.
Both were extensions of shifts grounded in the elite efforts to suppress the Taiping Rebellion in the
mid-nineteenth century. As Philip Kuhn described in his 1970 landmark book, Rebellion and Its
Enemies in Late Imperial China, the central government’s inability to suppress the Taiping rebels
forced local (mainly southern) elites to band together their own militias to protect their cities and
counties. These militia, in turn, became the recruiting grounds for full-blown armies (which unlike
militia, would fight away from home for long periods) under regional commanders; this was an
important step toward the warlordism that would wreak havoc in China in the 1910s and 1920s. This
tendency, which grew into a full-blown self-government movement in the first decade of the twentieth
century, moved alongside a growing fin de siècle Chinese nationalism (exemplified, for instance, in the
Boxer Rebellion). Both came to a head over a nationwide push to repurchase railroad rights (which is
one of the primary issues around which the Wuhan New Army member, who actually touched off the
Qing overthrow, had organized). In the wake of that event, local elites—some military leaders, others
old-school gentry—declared their independence from Beijing. The resulting tensions of growing
nationalism but also militarized localism plagued the young republic and reverberations of these
tensions can be traced down to the present day.
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